Meeting Competition Under the Robinson-Patman Act: Effective Enforcement Through Flexible Interpretation by Editors,
1965]
NOTES
MEETING COMPETITION UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATAAN ACT: EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
THROUGH FLEXIBLE INTERPRETATION
While chain stores came to the New World in 1670 with the almost
legendary Hudson Bay Company,1 it was the equally marvelous Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company which pioneered a dramatic shift in
consumer purchasing patterns after World War I. As chain stores star-
tlingly increased their sales from four percent of all retail business at the
war's end to 22.8 percent in 1935,2 the courts ruled that existing legislation
did not prohibit these buying-power giants from soliciting and accepting
discriminations in price from suppliers seeking their business. Existing
law permitted any difference in price where based on any difference in
quantity 3 To meet this situation the original draft of the Robinson-Patman
Bill prohibited discriminatory pricing absolutely 4  No provision was made
for the meeting of competition-a purposeful omission in a law born
basically of a desire to control large retailers 5 and thus to protect small
distributors.6 However, at the congressional conference the bill was
revised to legalize price discrimination where "made in good faith to meet
an equally low price of a competitor." 7 This proviso did not restore the
prior law's broad permission of price discrimination, but it offers an oppor-
tunity to harmonize the prohibitions of the Robinson-Patman Act with
the encouragement of competition basic to the other antitrust laws.
1 NICHOLS, CHAIN STORE MAuAL 8 (1932).
2 BECKmAN & NOLAN, THE CHAIN STORE PROBLEm 24-25 (1938).
3 38 Stat 730 (1914) : "Nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in
price. . . on account of differences in the grade, quality or quantity of the commodity
sold." See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939);
H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 16 (1936).
4 S. 3154, H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
5 See Max Factor & Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1f 16992, at 22066 (FTC July 22, 1964)
(to control "buying power").
6The catalyst of reform was the FTC, CHAIN STORE REPORT (1934) with its
revelations of large retailers' ability to obtain discriminatorily favorable prices.
Elimination of this power was believed necessary to save small distributors. See
Hearings Before House Special Committee To Investigate American Retail Feder-
ation, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. passin (1935); H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1936) ; S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
7 (b)Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this
section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities
furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing
justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section,
and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is
authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, how-
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I. COMPETITION AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
A. Significance of the Meeting Competition Defense
If the meeting competition defense is given viable interpretation, the
Robinson-Patman Act becomes consonant with the other antitrust laws.
Like both the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Robinson-Patman Act would
proscribe only price discriminations based upon economic power unrelated
to true economic advantages.8 At least under the words of the statute,
price discrimination where cost justified, competition justified, or demanded
by changed market conditions is legal. However, the Federal Trade Com-
mission has unnecessarily encumbered the Robinson-Patman Act with an
anticompetitive construction. From its enactment the Commission has
been hostile to the meeting competition defense to price discrimination.9
A direct holding of the United States Supreme Court was required to force
the Commission to recognize the defense as an absolute and not a condi-
tional barrier to Robinson-Patman Act convictions.' 0 The Commission
nonetheless kept untarnished until 1963 its record of never having volun-
tarily sustained the defense." Only after several reversals in the courts
ever, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the
prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing
of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities
furnished by a competitor.
Robinson-Patman Act §2(b), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (1958); see
H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
SAnti-chain store motivation must not be confused with the congressional intent
expressed in the legislation as enacted. Meeting competition was in fact allowed.
The Supreme Court has spoken of the difficulty of reconciling the Robinson-Patman
Act's "economic theory" with that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See Automatic
Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63, 73-74 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340
U.S. 231, 249 (1951); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392,
405-06 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The act's "economic theory" is not that
of its most vigorous sponsors who would have omitted the meeting competition justi-
fication entirely, but rather that of the Congress which included this proviso.
9 Immediately after the passage of the act, the Commission seemed to accept the
meeting competition clause; some of its early cease-and-desist orders recognized the
availability of the defense to charges brought under §2(a). BNA, ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. No. 170, at B-1 (Oct. 13, 1964). However, none of the FTC's
orders prior to Standard Oil, see note 10 infra, are necessarily inconsistent with the
Commission's later contention that the meeting competition defense was available in
answer to § 2(a), but only as one factor to be evaluated with other considerations.
10 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). The Commission had ruled
that an absolute defense was not provided by the statutory language of § 2(b). 41
F.T.C. 263, 281-83 (1945), modified on rehearing, 43 F.T.C. 56 (1946). Before the
Supreme Court the Commission argued that the statutory language permitted con-
sideration of a meeting competition defense only as one factor among others in deter-
mining whether the price discrimination carried the requisite anticompetitive effect.
The Commission did not literally urge that the defense should be unavailable when-
ever there might be an injury to competition at the resale level, as Mr. Justice Burton
apparently feared. 340 U.S. at 250-51.
"'While the theoretical availability of the meeting competition defense may
possibly have influenced field investigators in deciding not to recommend further
action in individual cases, not until December 1963 did the FTC finally accept, without
judicial compulsion, a meeting competition defense as a complete exculpation. Con-
tinental Baking Co., TRADE REG. REP. f 16720 (FTC Dec. 31, 1963). In Standard
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of appeals did the Commission finally agree to extend to promotional dis-
criminations the Supreme Court's specific order to accept meeting competi-
tion defenses to price discrimination.' 2 In this area reversal of the Com-
mission by the courts is not surprising. The judiciary has been far more
receptive than the Commission to the meeting competition clause, 13 and
to a large extent the interpretations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
recognizing the realities of competition have been judicial constructions.' 4
An interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act similarly favorable to
competition depends upon liberal acceptance of the meeting competition
clause. In contrast to the "reasonableness" qualification applied to alleged
violations of the Sherman Act and even to the broad criterion of the Clayton
Act-"substantially to lessen competition"-, 15 the Robinson-Patman Act
applies indiscriminately to all price discriminations which "prevent com-
petition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefits of such discrimination, or with the customers of either of them."'16
Oil, supra note 10, the Commission on remand confirmed its prior result by deciding
that Standard Oil, although now entitled by Supreme Court decision to assert a fully
exculpatory §2(b) defense, had not established it factually. 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953).
The Seventh Circuit reversed, 233 F.2d 649 (1956), and the Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeals' findings on the record, 355 U.S. 396 (1958). For the FTC's
continued refusal to allow the defense, see, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. pt. 1, at 636 (1957).
12See Robinson-Patman Act §2(d), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(d)
(1958). The FTC refused to apply the defense to promotional allowances in Henry
Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1535 (1956) (alternative holding), although the trial
examiner had ruled it applicable. Similar holdings, however, were reversed on appeal
in Shulton, Inc. v. FTC, 305 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1962), and in Exquisite Form Bras-
siere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1963).
On remand the Commission did accept the applicability of the defense, but found in
Exquisite Form that the respondent's price discrimination had not been made in good
faith. TRADE REG. REP. 116753 (FTC Jan. 20, 1964). In Shulton the hearing
examiner on remand upheld the § 2(b) defense and recommended dismissal of the
complaint. BNA, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 134, at A-9 (Feb. 4, 1964).
But the Commission, sub noma. Max Factor & Co., TRADE REG. REP. 16992 (FTC
July 22, 1964), ultimately dismissed the charges on other grounds without reaching
the meeting competition defense. See notes 106-09 infra and accompanying text.
Is See notes 107-13 infra and accompanying text.
14 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) : "In the antitrust field the courts have
been accorded, by common consent, an authority they have in no other branch of
enacted law."
15United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911); cf. Nash v.
United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
16 (a) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in com-
merce . . . and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the
cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or
quantities in which commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered:
And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent price
changes from time to time wherein response to changing conditions affecting
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This has engendered the widespread charge 7 that the act itself is in conflict
with the other antitrust laws, for this Robinson-Patman standard protects
both efficient and inefficient "competitors" without evaluating the overall
effect on total competition of a particular differential. The only qualifica-
tions to this rigid rule are found in the affirmative defenses.
The "changing conditions" defense '8 is necessarily exceptional in its
application and is irrelevant under normal circumstances. Moreover, the
use of this defense too has been severely restricted by the FTC.19 While
in theory price discriminations based on cost justification are permissible,
2
0
the difficulty of establishing a pure cost justification is overwhelming. As
the Supreme Court has said: "[C]ost justification being what it is, too
often no one can ascertain whether a price is cost-justified." 2 On only
a half-dozen occasions since the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act has
a respondent been fully exculpated through cost justification.22 The
majority of such defenses, although argued in full complexity, have been
rejected.22
Moreover, the significance of this defense is highly attenuated by the
business necessity of functional pricing, in which costs are not decisive
determinants of actual charges.24 In a competitive system only by the most
fortuitous circumstances will all enterprises sustain precisely identical costs
and benefit identically from cost savings resulting from sales in quantity.
Even as to prices set basically by cost, some allowance for meeting a com-
petitive price realistically should be permitted. 25
the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not
limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence
of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith
in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned.
Robinson-Patman Act §2(a), 49 Stat 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
'7 Arr'y GEN. NAT'L CoM m. ANTITRUS T REP. 181 (1955); Apsey, Establishing
Meeting Competition Defense to Charge of Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-
Patman Act, PRAc. LAw. 76-85 (Feb. 1957); Levi, The Robinson-Patman Act-Is
It in the Public Interest?, in ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW 60, 65 (1952).
18 Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958)
(fourth proviso).
19 See, e.g., Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 369 (9th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956); Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, TRADE RE.
REP. 1f 16666 (FTC Nov. 15, 1963); Sperry Rand Corp., TRADE REG. REP. 16350
(FTC March 18, 1963). But cf. Valley Plymouth v. Studebaker Packard Corp.,
219 F. Supp. 608 (S.D. Cal. 1963).2 0 Robinson-Patman Act §2(a), 49 Stat 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958)
(first proviso).2 1 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 79 (1953).
22 Rowe, The Federal Trade Commission's Administration of the Anti-Price Dis-
crimination Law, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 415, 424 n.49 (1964).2 3 As of 1961 only in five of fourteen fully argued cases had the FTC accepted
the justification, and even in these five cases the Commission did not consistently
permit the defense against all the differentials charged. Sawyer, Cost Justification,
9 ANTITRUST BULL. 285, 296-98 (1964).
2 4 See DAVIssON, MARKETING OF AUTOMOTIVE PARTS 953 (1958) ; SAWYER, Busi-
NESS ASPEcTS OF PRICING UNDER THE ROBINSoN-PATmAN ACT 6-7 (1963).
25 Adelman, Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General's Report,
104 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 236 (1955) : "[T]he real importance of section 2(b) is this:
it permits cost savings to be passed on, not directly by being 'justified' under 2(a),
but indirectly, through the need to meet the competition of the first sellers offering
the lower prices."
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Thus the meeting competition defense is basic to any reconciliation
among the various antitrust laws and is doubly important because of the
general unavailability of any other restraint on the unfortunate anticom-
petitive effects of an absolute prohibition against price differentials.
B. Inadequacies of the Robinson-Patuan Act
Restrictive FTC interpretation of the meeting competition defense
would place businessmen in a nightmarish quandry were it not for the
misdirection of the inadequate remedial provisions of the act. Although
the emergence of gigantic buying power led to the enactment of the
Robinson-Patman Act, the provisions of the law are largely concerned with
sellers. Section (f) does in fact make it unlawful for a buyer "knowingly
to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited" by
the act. However, the knowledge requirement in section (f) 26 makes con-
viction difficult-just as utilization of the meeting competition defense is
hindered where the Commission demands actual knowledge of the price
allegedly met.
27
This focus on sellers is unrealistic. Sellers have no incentive, inde-
pendent of competitive pressures, to offer discriminatorily lower prices
to any customers. Lower prices result from the ubiquitous "business
reason"-either a buyer's irresistible demand for preferential treatment, or
a competitor's offer which must be matched. If the seller maintains his
price, he may lose a customer; if he grants the differential, he might be
investigated by the FTC. But the seller's pragmatic choice is one-sided.
Historically the FTC has concentrated on inconsequential 28 complaints
randomly selected from its correspondence 2 9 Even if the seller should
come to the Commission's notice,30 he will be penalized, after consuming
considerable Commission time and effort if he contests the charge, by a
26 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
2 7 See notes 39-40 infra and accompanying text.
2 8 Investigators found in 1949 that 70% of the cases leading to FTC cease-and-
desist orders involved false and misleading advertisement, while the remaining 30%
affected small corporations of little consequence to the economy. CoMmisSIoN ON
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASx FORCE REPORT
ON REGULATORY COmmiSSIONS app. N, at 122 (1949). More recently the Commis-
sion has been reported to have a larger number of professional employees in the
restraint-of-trade division than in the deceptive advertising branch. Auerbach, The
Federal Trade Cominslsion: Internal Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REv.
383, 392 (1964). But this fact is itself deceptive, for the greater complexity of
restraint-of-trade cases no doubt requires a greater proportion of professional to
clerical and investigatory work than in deceptive advertising.
29 During the period 1958-1962, between one-third and two-thirds of all investi-
gations arose directly from complaints, not from independent FTC action. See the
estimates of Auerbach, supra note 28, at 393-94,-1958, 52%; 1959, 477o; 1960, 31%o;
1961, 69.2%; 1962, 62.8%o.
3o There were only 354 complaints issued by the Commission under § 2(a) during
the first 27 years of the act (through June 1963). Of these, 114 were dismissed or
dropped and 54 were still pending-leaving 186 total orders entered under this sec-
tion during the entire history of the act. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER TE
ROBINSoN-PATmAN Act 168 (Supp. 1964).
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cease-and-desist order effective after sixty days unless challenged in the
court of appeals.31 In effect the seller is informed that what he has already
done is illegal,3 2 and that he should not do it again.as The original trans-
gression is left unpunished 4 -save for the rare treble-damage suit,
3 5
notorious for its ineffectiveness.3"
In the meeting competition situation this inequality of temptation is
magnified because even ethical influences push the businessman toward
what may prove to be an "illegal" price. Since American business norms
argue for the validity of meeting competition, the uninformed businessman
may think good-faith meeting of competition unquestionably legal. His
mistake will result from reliance upon the plain meaning of the law.
Artificial requirements raised by the FTC may make meeting competition
illegal if the seller is not able to establish his defense by complying with
the Commission's substantive standards. At the same time, the ineffec-
tiveness of the act's penalty restraints make it unlikely that the act will
deter the most flagrant and unjustifiable price discrimination. A "spiral"
effect then multiplies the impact of these differentials; for once a single
seller reduces his prices to a single customer or group of customers, the
3173 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. IV, 1963). This automatic effective-
ness after 60 days dates back only to 1959. Previously the Commission was required
actively to seek enforcement of an order.
32The injured competitor may receive little solace, especially if he has been
driven out of business by the incursions. See Forster Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP.
16243 (FTC Jan. 3, 1963). The FTC's cease-and-desist order was vacated in
Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. WEEK
3284 (U.S. March 1, 1965).
33 On occasion the Commission has even based policy on the nonpunitive nature
of the cease-and-desist order. Thus, in Sears Roebuck & Co., TRADE REG. RaP. 16791
(FTC Feb. 17, 1964), it dismissed a § 2 (a) complaint based upon Sperry Rand's
offer of a recently discontinued typewriter model to Sears & Roebuck at a price
lower than that which had been generally available to Sears' competitors. The pro-
ceedings were dismissed on the grounds that the effect of the single incident here
involved was too insignificant to justify action: "The purpose of Commission cease and
desist orders is not to punish law violators, but to prevent the recurrence of unlawful
conduct." Id. at 21735.
34 Naturally, this lack of punitive enforcement has generated criticism. See
Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. 374 (1956); Austern, Five Thousand Dollars a Day, 51 Ky. L.J. 481 (1963).
35 Treble damage actions are authorized by 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1958) and 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1958). From 1936 to 1961, 111
private Robinson-Patman cases were reported. Final judgment for the plaintiff has
been reported in only six cases. Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws:
The Robinson-Patman Experience, 30 Gao. WAsH. L. Rav. 181, 191-92 (1961). For
the causes underlying the ineffectiveness of the private suits, see Tomlin, Private
Recovery Under the Robinson-Patinan Act-An Analysis and a Suggestion, 43
TEXAs L. Ray. 168, 173-88 (1964).
36 See Note, 32 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 300 (1958); 41 MINN. L. Ray. 830, 832
(1957). Even where the FTC has issued a cease-and-desist order, many district
courts have refused to admit the order as evidence in a private treble-damage suit.
See, e.g., Farmington v. Forster Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.)
1170953 (D. Maine Nov. 26, 1963). (The FTC's cease-and-desist order in the
Forster case was vacated in Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. WEK 3284 (U.S. March 1, 1965)). The courts of appeals
are split on admissibility, but the issue is now pending before the Supreme Court in
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 332 F.2d 346
(3d Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 877 (1964) (No. 291).
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response of other sellers is necessarily to offer the same differentials to
these buyers.
37
If the Robinson-Patman Act is to be more than theoretically consistent
with the competitive values of American antitrust law, it should be enforced
whenever possible to prevent buyers from receiving discriminatory prices,
but not to penalize the sellers who act to meet competition. The buyer
receives the benefit of the special price every time a seller offers it. Since
sellers who are responding to the illegal price then are tempted to offer
similarly illegal prices to their other customers in order to forestall further
business attacks by the original price-cutting seller, sound policy should
seek to break the "spiral" process as early as possible. To a large extent
the present law, without amendment, would allow implementation of such
a policy. With only a few recent exceptions, however, the FTC has
pursued almost a reverse policy-ignoring buyers and nullifying the
meeting competition defense, but leaving the spiral of discriminatory prices
without effective restraint.
II. MEETING COMPETITION IN "GOOD FAITH"
A price discrimination made to meet an equally low price of a com-
petitor must be made "in good faith." This phrase-omnipresent in regu-
latory legislation-has been rigidly interpreted by the Commission and
encumbered with objective standards. Under the Commission's analysis
a price discrimination, to be made in good faith, must exactly "meet" but
not "beat" a competitor's price; it must be made to "retain" and never
to "acquire" customers; and it must respond to a "known" price. The
Commission's concentration on such conceptualistic formulae contrasts
sharply with the practical attitude of most courts of appeals 38
3 T This analysis assumes, for the sake of simplicity, an identity of cost factors
for the various competitors, or at least such similarity that no seller's across-the-
board price to all customers can be above cost and still equal the discriminatory price
offered by a competitor to the favored customer. Such a price thus available to all
buyers would not violate the price-discrimination law.
38A striking example of the dichotomy is the recent reversal by the Seventh
Circuit of the FTC decision in American Oil Co., 60 F.T.C. 1786 (1963), rev'd, 325
F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964). The FTC had rejected
Amoco's meeting competition defense to charges of having reduced prices to some
but not all of its gasoline stations in a given area. Amoco had responded to a localized
"gas war" by making reductions only to the stations faced by immediately proximate
price-cutting, but not to those further removed but apparently somewhat affected by
the conflict. The FTC found that the profered meeting competition defense did not
meet another of its formulae, the "legality" test-that is, respondent had not satisfied
its evidentiary burden of demonstrating the likely legality of the price it claimed to
be meeting. See notes 74-76 infra and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit,
however, could not reach this legality issue due to the intervening Stin Oil decision
of the Supreme Court, 371 U.S. 505 (1963), which held that the meeting competition
defense was inapplicable to discounts by a gasoline distributor to retail stations involved
in a price -war, because in such a situation the distributor was meeting its buyer's
competition and not its own. The situation in American Oil was identical in form,
since Amoco's distributors were engaged in a price war initially triggered by an
independent retailer's price reduction. Although Amoco, in effect, was seeking to
meet its customer's competition, it was not to be denied judicial protection. The
court of appeals singularly held that there had been no injury to competitors since
the stations which did not receive the price reduction were left no worse off than
1965]
722 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.113:715
A. Meeting but Not Beating Competition
The Commission insists that a seller must demonstrate a knowledge
of the competitor's price prior to the seller's own response. Thus, in
Forster Mfg. Co.. 9 the Commission found that Forster, which had driven
its major competitor out of business by lawful across-the-board but below-
cost reductions in the price of wooden skewers, was not entitled to the
meeting competition defense to charges of price discrimination in ice-cream
spoons, since it lacked "knowledge" of the price offered for this commodity
by its competitor.4
Another issue presented by the FTC's objective "beating" criterion
arises in cases of precise duplication of prices offered by competitors whose
products, in the Commission's opinion, have previously received inferior
public acceptance. 41 Thus, in the most recent development in the famous
they had been previously-they were still unable to compete with the stations which
were offering competing makes at reduced prices. This, of course, ignores the fact
that as a result of the price discrimination they were less able to compete, for if the
reduction had been uniform, they would have been able to match the lower prices then
available from other dealers.
3 9 TRADE REG. REP. 16243 (FTC Jan. 3, 1963), rev'd, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. W=E 3284 (U.S. March 1, 1965).
40 Chairman Dixon, speaking before the New York City Bar Association on
January 30, 1964, explained Forster as requiring three determinations by a seller
seeking to invoke § 2(b): "(1) that the buyer seeking the lower price has in fact
received a competitive offer; (2) the identity of the competitor that made the
competitive offer; and (3) the actual price at which the competitor allegedly offered
to sell to this buyer." TRADE REG. REP. 1 50220, at 55272. The Chairman's apparent
assumption of a "buyer seeking the lower price" is revealing since it ignores the
possibility that a buyer, once having attained discriminatorily lower prices, will not
solicit further sellers at this same price. The competing seller often will have to
take "offensive" steps in his own defense by approaching the buyer. If Chairman
Dixon's assumption is correct as to buyers "seeking" lower prices, then there is all
the more reason to treat gently sellers who are responding at the request of purchasers
to discriminations by their competitors.
41 The evaluation of such "public acceptance" is most difficult, for it is often a
subjective determination and is sometimes complicated by other antitrust considera-
tions. Thus in the gasoline distribution industry the so-called independent brands
are subject to effective price control by the large companies, whose vertical inte-
gration permits them to regulate the amount of independently refined crude oil avail-
able to the consuming market. So-called "price-cutting independent jobbers" thus
are often dependent upon the major companies whose ability to deprive the independents
of gasoline prevents them from price-cutting below a given figure. In turn major
company power is balanced by fear of antitrust prosecutions. Rostow & Sachs, Entry
Into the Oil Refining Business: Vertical Integration Re-examined, 61 YALE L.J. 856,
912 (1952). See CASSADY & JONES, THE NATURE OF COMPETITION IN GASOLINE
DIsTRIBuTIoN AT THE RETAIL LEVL-A STUDY OF THE Los ANGELES MARxET AA
116-27 (1951). The results of the present comprehensive investigation of the
petroleum industry by the Department of Justice, see TRADE REG. REP. No 178, at 2
(Dec. 14, 1964), will undoubtedly yield fresh information. Commission refusal to
allow the meeting competition defense to large companies reacting to the competition
of price-cutting jobbers would have the effect of weakening large-company control of
gasoline pricing and hence would yield a result favorable to competition. It seems more
reasonable, however, to rely on the Sherman Act in this area rather than a contorted
interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act. Moreover, the evaluation of an "inferior
product" is rendered still more difficult in the gasoline area by the fact that the
private brands are often of precisely the same origin as the more popular brands.
It is doubtful whether the Robinson-Patman Act should be utilized in such a manner
as to negative the values of trademarks and advertising through an interpretation
which protects lesser-known "private brands" from price competition.
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Sun Oil Co. case,4 the FTC hearing examiner again rejected Sun's meet-
ing competition defense, because the price discrimination involved was not
undertaken in response to competitor Cities Service's price to the retailer
of private-brand "Supertest." The examiner added that "meeting the price
of an inferior product or one of substantially less public acceptance amounts
to undercutting rather than meeting a competitor's price." 43
Such a description suggests that the characterization of a price as
"beating" competition really involves the evaluation of "good faith," rather
than any wholly objective requirement of precisely equaling a competitor's
price. Congress has spoken appropriately through a purpose clause; thus
it is the seller's intent, rather than the effect of the price, with which the
act is here concerned.44 Only under this interpretation could the Supreme
Court hold that "section 2(b) does not require the seller to justify price
discriminations by showing that in fact they met a competitive price." 45
Accordingly, the courts have consistently held that a mere incidental under-
cutting of price will not negate a section 2(b) meeting competition
defense.46 A price substantially lower than that to which it is supposedly
responding may compellingly suggest that the price discrimination was not
in fact a good-faith response to another seller's price.4 7 If the defendant's
motive is not thus refuted, the mere fact that his response was "overly
competitive" is of itself insignificant.
If the issue, then, is "good faith," any inflexible requirement of specific
price knowledge seems unreasonable. As the Commission admitted in
4 2 TRAE REG. Rn'. 1 16933 (FTC June 9, 1964).
43 Id. at 21998.
For earlier instances of such Commission reliance on degree of public acceptance,
see Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923, 952 (1953), rev'd, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956),
aff'd, 355 U.S. 396 (1958); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351,
396-97 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 206 (1952). For the same phenomenon in a judicial setting, see Gerber
Prods. Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916, 921-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
The Commission, inconsistently, refuses to allow a greater degree of public
acceptance of a brand-name product to justify its sale to retailers at a higher price
than that set for the sale of the same product under a private brand. If degree of
public acceptance "is appropriate in considering the grade and quality of products for
purposes of section 2(b), it is equally applicable to that determination under section
2(a)." Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964).
44 Of course only limited significance can be given to the plain meaning of an
act characterized as "one of the most collossal failures of communications in the
annals of United States legislative history." Timberg, Book Review, 57 Nw. U.L.
Riv. 494 (1962). By contrast to such ambiguous statutes as the FTC Act, however,
Robinson-Patman presents a clear standard of illegality and reasonably clear criteria
of positive defenses.
45 FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759 (1945).
46Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956); Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 155 F.2d 1016
(2d Cir. 1946).
47 Commissioner Elman, dissenting in Forster, suggested that in fact overall "bad
faith" in the form of predatory price warfare by the respondent, rather than any guilt
for the particular price discrimination charged, lay behind the Commission's decision
in Forster and warned against "throwing the book at a respondent who has engaged
in reprehensible conduct." TRADE REG. REP. 16243, at 21091 (FTC Jan. 3, 1963).
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Continental Baking Co.,4 8 "rigid rules and inflexible absolutes are especially
inappropriate in dealing with the 2(b) defense . . ... , However, the
Commission still refuses to relieve sellers from the inflexible specific knowl-
edge requirement. Thus three weeks after its pronouncment in Continental
Baking, the Commission in Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc.,r° rejected a
defense of meeting competitors' advertising credits to retailers, because of
respondent's failure to adduce evidence that it "was in any manner aware
of these particular advertisements," or "as a matter of practice and policy,
regularly made itself aware of competitor's specific cooperative advertise-
ments . ... " The respondent, in fact, had appended a chart pur-
porting to show that all its advertising allowances were made solely in
response to prior advertising allowances of its competitors.
The Commission's reliance on the "no evidence" finding emphasizes
the unreasonableness of the knowledge requirement. The question properly
before the FTC in Exquisite Form was whether the chart and other
material were sufficient to establish good faith. The decision should not
have been based purely on a lack of precise knowledge. In the business
world such knowledge is often impossible to attain, and where it is available,
it will often be unreliable. A buyer seeking promotional or price discounts
has a strong motive to set too low a figure for offers made by competing
sellers, or even to offer detailed accounts of nonexistent offers. Competing
sellers have every reason to deny offering such possibly illegal prices or
allowances. Respondents should be allowed to act reasonably on the basis
of information available under the circumstances, and this reasonableness
should be evaluated as an element of good faith.
2
In fact, in industries more complicated than women's foundation gar-
ments, compliance with any specific knowledge requirement is an impos-
sibility. How, for example, is a gasoline distributor to meet the "price"
of an integrated supplier-retailer? Any "price" in this context necessarily
would be an artificial construct.5 Even where price lists are available to
4 8 Continental Baking Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16720 (FTC Dec. 31, 1963).
49 Id. at 21647.
5 0 TRADE REG. RE'. 1 16753 (FTC Jan. 20, 1964) (promotional allowance case);
see Robinson-Patman Act § 2(d), 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1958).
1 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16753, at 21689 (FTC Jan.
20, 1964).
52 In reversing the Commission's decision in Forster, see note 39 supra ana
accompanying text, the First Circuit observed that the Commission's proper role is
to evaluate the reasonableness of the knowledge acted upon in evaluating a meeting
competition defense. Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964). Any
other knowledge requirement is unrealistic, for "the seller wants the highest price
he can get and the buyer wants to buy as cheaply as he can, and . . . neither expects
the other, or can be expected, to lay all his cards face up on the table." Id. at 56.
63 See The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 77 -ARV. L. Rxv. 81, 175 (1963). This
is precisely the situation not covered by the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v.
Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963). See note 38 Vspra. Ironically, academic comment
mistakenly construed the decision as sharply limiting the effectiveness of the meeting
competition defense, paying too little heed to the Court's specific statement that it
was not establishing a rule for the situation presented by retail gas-war competition
from an integrated price-cutter or by a retailer-competitor who has received a specific
price-cut from his supplier. See, e.g., 15 BAYIoR L. REv. 93, 96 (1963). These two
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the public, as they are in many industries, such information usually does
not establish a specific price for an individual commodity under all condi-
tions. In most cases different customers will pay differing complete prices
for the same or closely similar goods after discounts or allowances are
calculated .5 Variations in pricing, so-called ad hoc pricing, are always
possible and are not necessarily illegal. Furthermore, even if the com-
ponent price is available to a potential respondent, the ultimate price-
the one as to which precise knowledge is required-will still vary with the
calculation of transportation and packing charges, deductions for delivery
to the buyer's truck, or other services rendered by the buyer.
Moreover, reliance on the knowledge standard easily lends itself to
abuse. There is a possibility that the formalistic acquisition of a "file" on
competitors' prices by companies whose attorneys are conversant with
present FTC practice may permit sellers who are acting in bad faith to
exculpate themselves, while actual good-faith practitioners may be con-
victed because of their lack of complete knowledge. Finally, broader anti-
trust considerations militate against encouraging exchange of price in-
formation among competitors; the temptation to arrange prices and thus
violate the Sherman Act is omnipresent even without official encourage-
ment 5 In situations with competitive-bidding attributes, competition
would be sharply curtailed if the Commission prohibits pricing practices
which in fact are competitive, but are necessarily made in ignorance of
other sellers' sealed bids.
B. "Defensive" or "Offensive" Competition
Despite judicial objections and practical obstacles the Commission
continues to restrict the meeting competition defense to differentials granted
to "retain" rather than "acquire" customers. While this restriction has
on occasion gained court approval,5 6 more recent decisions have reversed
the Commission's restrictive formulation.5 7 The Commission has refused to
seek Supreme Court review of the cases allowing "offensive" price discrim-
inations justified by the use of the meeting competition "defense," and it has
exceptions present the only two cases where a distributor's price cut in a gasoline
war would be truly "meeting competition." The Commission itself in Ponca Whole-
sale Mercantile Co., TRADE RE. REP. f116814 (FTC Feb. 24, 1964), recognized the
defense as available where a wholesaler was meeting the price of a manufacturer
selling directly to the retailer. Such a construction is unassailable and indicates that
the Supreme Court's decision in Sut Oil does not of itself involve any diminution
of competitive justification.
4 SAwYER, BusINEss AsPEcTs OF PRICING UNDER THE ROBINSoN-PATm AN Acr
§ 1.2, at 7 (1963).
55 See Galgay, Antitrust Considerations in the Exchange of Price Information
Among Competitors, 8 ANrrrausr BuLL. 617 (1963)
56 Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 826 (1959) ; accord, C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958).
57 Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962) (discriminatory
prices for potato chips); accord, Delmar Constr. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
1961 Trade Cas. 1 69947 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
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relied on the split of authority in the courts of appeals to justify unmodified
continuation of its prior policy.58 This reluctance is not surprising, for the
Commission's interpretation is in no wise based on judicial or Congressional
mandate; the legislative history provides no direction. On first introducing
this limitation in Anhauser-Busch, Inc.,5 9 the FTC relied primarily upon
the Supreme Court's Standard Oil Co. v. FTC decision.6 Since that
case involved Standard's attempt to retain its jobbers in the face of repeated
offers of lower prices from its competitors, it would have been difficult for
the Court not to speak obiter dictum of customer retention.61 But since
the Court's basic holding was to reject the Commission's claim that section
2(b) did not in any way constitute a complete defense, the Commission's
employment of the decision to emasculate the defense 62 is unjustifiable.
To the contrary the language of Standard Oil should be limited to the facts
of the case in order not to "promulgate a general doctrine surrounding
each seller with a protected circle of customers." 6
The Commission's construction is doubly unfortunate, for in addition
to placing the Robinson-Patman Act unnecessarily in conflict with the
overriding pro-competitive antitrust laws, it is practically unworkable in
light of normal business operations. Accurate identification of a "cus-
tomer" in the business world is virtually impossible; actually, every pur-
chaser of a commodity is a potential customer of every seller of that com-
modity.6 An absolute requirement of "retaining customers" is ill-equipped
to categorize the "customer" who buys from the seller some but not all of
his requirements of the goods in question, the "customer" who buys from
the seller other goods but not the particular products for which the dis-
count is offered, the "customer" who has bought in the past but has made
no recent purchase, or the "customer" who has negotiated with a view
toward buying but has not yet completed the contract. Evaluation of such
gradations will ultimately involve an inquiry into the seller's intent and
understanding in offering the price differential-a subjective factor. The
only objective alternative would be an absolute interpretation of the stand-
ard to reject any claim of meeting competition unless a differential is made
by a seller in response to a competitor's offer made itself in response to the
seller's original offer to a purchaser who has previously bought from the
seller all his requirements of a particular commodity. Such a competitively
stagnating interpretation would surely be rejected by the courts of appeals
5sFTC Position on Meeting Competition Defense, TRADE REG. REP. f 50166
(Nov. 23, 1962).
69 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), rev'd, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 536
(1960).
1o 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
' Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 240 (1951).
62 Id. at 242.
wArr'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTTRrUST REP. 184 (1955).
64 Cf. Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look
at Robinson-Patinan, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 970 (1951).
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in view of their refusal to accept even the Commission's current inter-
pretation. And any large-scale attempt to identify customers by advisory
definition would be stymied by the undeveloped state of the Commission's
advisory-regulation procedure.65
However, existing Commission dicta suggest that it is possible to
construct a more flexible test. Even if a seller "must consider the size
and strength of the competitor whose price he is meeting and tailor his
counteroffer to the scope of that offer," 66 Commission interpretation of
that response through an evaluation of the seller's pragmatic intent seems
sufficient to prevent any misuse of a meeting competition defense. The
Commission should find no fault with a price differential motivated by a
desire to avoid losing a sale, where the seller's nonpredatory 11 business
practices place him in a competitive, but not necessarily a purely defensive,
situation in relation to other sellers who independently have offered to any
buyer a price below the seller's standard rate. But where there is no
legitimate competitive challenge, price differentials, whether "defensive" or
"offensive," should not be permitted.
III. THE REQUIREMENT OF MEETING A "LAWFUL" PRIcE
An elastic interpretation of the Commission's requirement that any
price met should be a "lawful" one would facilitate a reconciliation of the
prohibition on price discrimination with the permission of competition.
The requirement itself is consonant with more pervasive antitrust con-
siderations. If "unlawful" prices could be met, price discrimination would
spiral; a pricing system of discriminations 68 could justify similar responses
throughout the industry on an ever-widening basis-with the original
discriminator alone being liable to an eventual cease-and-desist order.
The Commission, however, has defined "lawfulness" in a manner which
would prohibit even legitimate competitive response.
15 Only since July 1, 1962, has any formal procedure been available for soliciting
the Commission's advice on the legal implications of possible business actions. These
advisory opinions normally concern particular situations and are issued in response
to industry requests for guidance. As of March 1964 only about eighty such requests
had been acted upon, and, in about twenty percent of these cases, the Commission
found it impracticable to respond. Address by G. S. Rountree, Chief of the FTC's
Division of Advisory Opinion, Bureau of Industry Ordinance, before District of Colum-
bia Bar Association, March 24, 1964, in TRD. REG. REP. 50229.
66Forster Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP. [ 16243, at 21087 (FTC Jan. 3, 1963).
67 What constitutes a "predatory" position should be determined by reference to
the other antitrust laws.
08 Every combination or arrangement of prices can in one sense be termed a
"pricing system." A classic example of a "discriminatory pricing system" is found
in Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945), and FTC v. A. E.
Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945), which involved a basing-point arrangement
of prices under which sellers of glucose, disregarding actual plant locations, set all
prices f.o.b. Chicago. The issue is primarily one of fact. It is the existence of a
pattern of differentiation unjustified by cost or other relevant pricing considerations
which makes a pricing system discriminatory, not the mere absorption of freight
charges or basing-point arrangement. 324 U.S. at 757.
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A. Commission Intractability
In establishing its lawfulness requirement, the Commission has elevated
judicial and legislative scraps into an absolute barrier which significantly
reduces the effectiveness of the defense. The legislative history reveals
a single statement, that of Representative Utterback,69 explaining that only
"legal" prices could be met under the proposed meeting competition
proviso,70 but the bill as passed did not contain a legality requirement.
The prohibition on the meeting of illegal prices was explicitly formulated
in the pricing-systems cases,71 where the "meeting of competition" in re-
sponse to well-developed patterns of discriminatory pricing by competitors
was prohibited. The language of Standard Oil,"2 in which the Supreme
Court made legal the meeting of an "equally low, lawful price," must be
understood as written in the light of the previous pricing-systems cases.
The use of the word "lawful" in Standard Oil was gratuitous, since legality
of price was not there in question. However, the Commission proceeded
to interpret the Standard Oil decision as blanket justification for a "law-
fulness" requirement. As usual, the courts did not unanimously agree,73
and the Commission has relied upon the split in the circuits to justify
unmodified continuation of an interpretation unpopular with the judiciary.
Despite Congress' failure to consider the issue, the Commission has
gone far beyond the Standard Oil dictum by requiring respondents to come
forward with positive evidence that at the time of discrimination they had
reason to believe that competitors' prices were lawful. In Tri-Valley
Packing Ass'n 74 and in American Oil Co.,75 the Commission rejected meet-
ing competition defenses because respondent "did not adduce evidence to
show that it had reason to believe that the prices of its competitors were
lawful" and therefore had "not established on the record that it acted in
good faith." 76 This subjective conceptualization of the lawfulness re-
quirement suggests that it is but another element of the overriding "good
faith" standard. It is therefore not surprising that, as with other aspects
'9 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936).
70 Rowe suggests, however, that Representative Utterback's remarks were meant
to apply only on the retail level, announcing congressional understanding that dis-
criminations to match previous nonresponsive discriminatory prices to large buyers
were illegal and not to indicate any general requirement of "legality." RowE, PRICE
DiSCRIm I NATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATmAN Acr 215 (1962). Representative
Utterback appears, however, to have been speaking in a general context.
71 Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 144 F.2d 211, 217 (7th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 726,
753-54 (1945).
72 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 250 (1951).
73 See, e.g., Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
74 60 F.T.C. 1134, rev'd on other grounds, 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964).
75 60 F.T.C. 1786 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964).
76Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, 60 F.T.C. 1134, 1181 (1962) (Finding of Fact
No. 9).
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of "good faith," the Commission's lawfulness requirement has been en-
cumbered with inflexible objective criteria.
B. "Lawfulness" as an Element of "Good Faith"
To require production of evidence of reasons for believing the com-
petitor's price to be lawful presupposes an unrealistic competitive en-
vironment. Whether a price is "lawful" or not is a legal, not a business
concept, and, as this Note illustrates, it is complex and difficult for the
Commission and courts to evaluate. For example, in the Tri-Valley case
itself,7 7 more than five years and many legal steps passed before the court
of appeals determined that the information available was still deficient and
remanded the case to the Commission for additional factual findings.78 In
contrast the Commission expects the businessman to make an immediate
decision on legality at his own peril and without the Commission's fact-
finding tools.
Businessmen do not make such complex judgments in the exigency
of the market place. Normally there is no evidence to indicate whether
or not the competitor's price is "lawful." The businessman cannot assume
that his competitor's cost structure is the same as his, and antitrust con-
siderations prevent or should prevent full access to his competitor's pricing
bases.79 Cost-justification is not infrequently fought to the Supreme
Court, °0 and the competitor may have been faced with a meeting competition
situation in response to a third seller's offer. The respondent's inability
to show positive grounds for a reasonable belief that the competitor's price
was lawful is not inconsistent with the absence of reasons for believing
the price unlawful.
Nor will counsel be able reasonably to evaluate the "lawfulness" of the
competitor's price, for he will rely only on the generally inconclusive in-
formation available to his client. Given the pattern of Commission hostility,
conservative counsel will certainly never advise businessmen to rely con-
fidently upon the meeting competition defense. However, a candid attor-
ney may advise his client of the inconsequential punitive results of meeting
an unlawful price81 If, as a result of counsel's advise, the competitor's
price is not met or if business motivation leads the client to respond with
a discriminatory price, competition has been restricted or the law has been
violated without any actual determination of whether the price being met
is illegal. In either event counsel's advice has not contributed to a result
more lawful than the unadvised businessman alone would have reached.
Moreover, the Commission's interposition of absolute evidentiary criteria
77 No. 7225, FTC, Aug. 6, 1958.
7 8 Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964).
-7 0 AI'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTrrRusT REP. 182 (1955).
80 See Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under
the Robinson-Patan Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 21-23 (1956); Note, 66 YA~x L.J.
935-36 (1957) ; note 21 supra.
81 See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
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may lead to abuse by bad-faith businessmen-just as it does in the "specific
knowledge" context.8 Where the businessman does what he would have
done anyway, but counsel skillfully directs the appearance of his action,
good faith is not necessarily present.
The apparent lawfulness of a competitor's price is basic to a flexible
evaluation of good faith. Where a competitor's price is unquestionably
illegal, as with pricing systems, the Commission should have no difficulty in
presenting evidence to establish the obvious illegality of the price when met
and hence the apparent absence of good faith. To the extent that a com-
petitor's price could not appear clearly legal or illegal to the seller at the
time it was met, "legality" should be irrelevant to an evaluation of good
faith. Where a pricing system is matched by a responsive system, an in-
ference of the absence of good faith is justified. But where a competitor
utilizes a pricing system, a respondent should be free to discriminate as to a
particular price if by a preponderance of factors his differentiation is found
to be legitimately in reaction to and limited to the competitor's impact on
his own sales-that is if he has not established his own "pricing system"
in response.Yz
The balanced evaluation here suggested is not alien to Commission
thinking: it is precisely the type of evaluation which the Commission itself
urged on the Supreme Court in Standard Oil, where it requested the right
to evaluate the meeting competition defense only as one factor in deter-
mining whether the price differentiation had been competitively harmful
and thus in violation of section 2(a).s1 Prior to 1962 Commission counsel
often freely undertook the burden of demonstrating that respondents could
not possibly have believed competitors' prices to be lawful. Thus in
Callaway Mills Co.,8s Commission counsel argued that respondent knew
or should have known that prices being met were unlawful. In Continental
Baking Co.,s a section 2(b) defense was upheld by the Commission in a
landmark decision without any objection to the insistence by respondent's
counsel that the Commission had the burden of proof of "showing that the
buyer had reason to believe that the price he was receiving was unlawful."
Moreover, in the analogous case of buyer's solicitation of a price discrimina-
tion, the Supreme Court has held that proof of a violation requires a
82 See p. 725 supra.
8a Where confronted with an overall pricing "system," the Robinson-Patman
Act and the other antitrust laws allow a system-wide response. Moreover, across-
the-board price reductions become more feasible when the scope of the competitor's
pricing system is greater. The meeting competition defense is concerned with indi-
vidual situations where the respondent by economic choice or necessity does not
make an across-the-board response. But once overall pricing structures are involved,
across-the-board responses, or, if possible, cost-justified reductions to large purchasers,
are not an unreasonable requirement.
8 4 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 251 (1951).
S5 TRADE REG. REP. 15412 (FTC Sept. 29, 1961) (hearing examiner upheld
§2(b) defense for carpet maker), rev'd, TRADE REG. REP. 1116800 (FTC Feb. 10,
1964).
86 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16720 (FTC Dec. 31, 1963).
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showing by the Commission of the buyer's knowing receipt of an illegal
price concession. The Commission was required to demonstrate that the
buyer must have known or necessarily suspected that price differentiation
in his favor was violative of the law-that is, that competition was sub-
stantially reduced.8 7
C. The Need To Retain the Lawfulness Requirement
The Commission's general reluctance to interpret the Robinson-Patman
Act to facilitate competitive response has resulted in a demand for abolition
of the lawfulness requirement and even in suggestions of a policy per-
mitting only unlawful prices to be met.88 However, if the requirement were
completely eliminated, it would have the undesirable result of encouraging
a spiraling of discriminatory prices throughout an industry. Moreover, the
Commission would be deprived of an important subject of inquiry in
establishing the respondent's good faith-the basic thrust of the meeting
competition defense.
The attractiveness of an "unlawfulness" requirement arises from an
analogy between the meeting competition defense and a criminal attack88
Unlawful prices are the unlawful attack; lawful prices, a lawful attack.
Hence self-defense permits only unlawful prices to be met, just as only
unlawful assaults can be met in the criminal law.90 However, an unlaw-
fulness requirement also fails to recognize business realities. The "char-
acteristic" of the price is not imputable to its competitive effect. A lawful
price reduction steals a customer as effectively as an illegal one. To a
businessman the object of concern is not the legal characterization of
another seller's price, but the impact that price will have on the first
seller's market. The criminal law does not expect a man in physical danger
to reach a personal verdict as to the possible exculpation of his assailant
by intricate legal factors of incapacity. The law requires reasonable
87 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). The difficulty
in establishing a § 2(f) violation arises from the evidentiary burden of showing that
the buyer had knowledge that the situation was exceptional and that the buyer actively
requested the discrimination. The meeting competition defense assumes that respondent
had some knowledge of the situation to which he is claiming a "response." In this
context the Commission should only be concerned with the alleged illegality of the
price being met where that "illegality" was clearly apparent to the respondent. Con-
viction in appropriate cases will not be prevented, for the Commission should have
other factors from which to find an absence of good faith.
8 8 An "unlawfulness" requirement has been urged by various commentators.
E.g., AUsTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT 99 (2d rev. ed. 1959) ; Continental Baking Co., TRADE REG. REP. 16720,
at 21649 (FTC Dec. 31, 1963) (Maclntyre, Comm'r, dissenting); Note, 43 MINN.
L. REv. 327, 338-39 (1958). The "lawfulness" requirement has been criticized by a
minority in ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTrrRUST REP. 185 (1955) and by other
writers. See ZoRN€ & FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAWS 133-34
(1937); Note, 36 COLUm. L. REv. 1285, 1312 & n.146 (1936); Note, 48 VA. L. REv.
1294, 1303 (1962).
s9 See, e.g., PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 98 (1963).
90 See Continental Baking Co., TRADE REG. REP. 16720, at 21649-50 (FTC Dec.
31, 1963) (Maclntyre, Comm'r, dissenting).
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response in the criminal attack situation: sufficient force to repel, obligation
to retreat where retreat is reasonable.91
Moreover, semantic differentiations of "lawfulness-unlawfulness" are
merely formalistic, since the effect of either is decisively determined by
the Commission's assignment of the evidentiary burden. A shift in ter-
minology from "lawfulness" to "unlawfulness" would simply preserve in
altered form the present anticompetitive interpretation, not remedy it.
Under an unlawfulness interpretation sellers presumably would have to
supply reasons for their belief that the prices met were unlawful. Their
market response, however, would still be on a business basis: if loss of a
customer were at stake, the inefficacy of Commission deterrents would
indicate a decision to meet the competitor's price.
Since neither definition differs in its capacity to affect the "spiral" of
price discrimination, the FTC should expect a reasonable response, here de-
lineated by the concept of "good faith" and motivated by the desire to
compete. The nature of the opponent's attack should be of interest only
to the extent that it illuminates the nature of the respondent's reaction.
IV. TowARD COMPETITIvE NONDISCRIMINATION UNDER PRESENT LAW
A. Trends in Enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act
1. Commission Acceptance of the Meeting Competition Defense
Recent months have witnessed a number of startling developments in
Commission policy toward enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act. The
FTC has now accepted meeting competition defenses in situations basically
similar to those in which for some twenty-five years it had always rejected
the defense. For example, in the original Standard Oil case, 92 even after
remand, the Commission had refused to allow the meeting competition
defense. On the facts of the case, the court of appeals disregarded alleged
FTC expertise and reversed the Commission, and the Supreme Court
affirmed this factual interpretation.9 3 Suddenly, in Continental Baking,
the Commission made a factual finding that the respondent had granted
discriminatory discounts only where equal or larger discounts had been
given by its competitors and only where they were necessary "to continue
selling to the customer in question." 94 The Commission observed that
the discounts had been given only after long forbearance and that the com-
pany had taken care to verify its customers' claimed discounts through
its own "on-the-spot sales representatives." The factual situation in
Continental Baking is so compelling that it almost might serve as a guide
9' See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921) ; State v. Thomas, 184
N.C. 757, 114 S.E. 834 (1922).
1
92 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951) ; see notes 10, 11, 72, 84 supra
and accompanying text.
93 FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 233 F2d 649 (1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
0 TRADE REG. REP. ff 16720, at 21647-48 (FTC Dec. 31, 1963).
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to business counsel in illustrating the conditions under which discounts
might be given in safe reliance upon the meeting competition defense.
Given the Commission's fixed adherence to objective criteria, it may become
a model for formalistically satisfactory, but in fact not truly competitive,
price discriminations overseen by counsel.95
While the Commission needed twenty-five years to accept its first
meeting competition defense voluntarily in Continental Baking, the second
followed within two months. In Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co.,96 a
cigarette wholesaler had offered a six to seven cent price discount ex-
clusively to a few large retailers to prevent these retailers from purchasing
directly from a manufacturer engaged in dual distribution. The facts were
thus suitable for the possible creation of another Commission rigidity-a
requirement of same-level competition with the seller whose price had been
met. The FTC had strong incentive to fashion such a standard, for in
Sun Oil the Supreme Court had affirmed the Commission's contention
that price discrimination is justifiable under the meeting competition defense
only where the price being met is that of the seller's own competitor.
97
Complaint counsel argued that the wholesaler was not truly in com-
petition with the manufacturer because of the New Mexico requirement
that state tax stamps on the cigarette packages be affixed within the state
boundaries, a requirement with which the out-of-state manufacturer could
not comply. The Commission could have ruled that the section 2(b)
defense is available only against "full competitors"-those who in every
essential, not only in price, are engaged in competition at the same level as
respondent. However, the Commission rejected the hearing examiner's
conclusion that the meeting competition defense was unavailable because
the wholesaler was not in competition with the manufacturer. The Com-
mission refused "a strained and hypertechnical definition of competition
not consonant with the realities of the market place," 18 and preferred to
stress the realities of competition. The retailers would certainly have
bought from the manufacturer and affixed the stamps themselves, rather
than lose the lower rates which otherwise would have been available only
from the manufacturer.
Finally, Beatrice Foods Co.Y9 indicates that the new attitude has
reached even to the field stage. In that case a hearing examiner sustained
95 Respondent's good-faith reliance upon counsel may even, in exceptional cases,
prevent a cease-and-desist order from issuing. Thus the hearing examiner considered
it "unnecessary" to issue an order against Furr's, Inc., where respondent, charged
with violating § 5 of the FTC Act through soliciting discriminatory promotional
allowances, made "an affirmative good-faith effort not to violate the law." Counsel's
advice, which eventually proved unsound, nullified the effort. Furr's, Inc., TaDE
REG. REP. 1 17141 (FTC Nov. 27, 1964).
96 Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16814 (FTC Feb. 24,
1964).
97 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
98 Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co., TRADE REG. REP. 11 16814, at 21790 (FTC
Feb. 24, 1964).
99 TRADE REG. REP. 1 17071 (FTC Sept. 15, 1964).
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a meeting competition defense to charges of illegally discriminatory prices
and allowances to favored purchasers of dairy products. The examiner
found a factual situation similar to that in Continental Baking-specific
replies to known offers by competitors, verified by respondent's local sales
representatives.
2. Continuation of the Absolute Criteria
Despite its recognition of the subjective nature of the good faith
standard, the Commission has not renounced any of its absolute criteria.
In fact in Continental Baking, notwithstanding Commissoner Maclntyre's
insistence that the lawfulness requirement certainly would be struck down
by the Supreme Court and that an unlawfulness requirement should prevail,
the Commission did not take the opportunity to relieve respondents of
the requirement of showing grounds from which a reasonable man might
have inferred that the price being met was lawful.1' ° Moreover, just two
weeks before its decision in Ponca, the Commission added yet another
inflexible element to its concept of good-faith meeting of competition. In
Callaway Mills Co.,1 1 it held that a seller utilizing the defense must estab-
lish that his competitor's price was for merchandise comparable in quality
of materials and construction to the merchandise offered by the seller. 02
Also early in 1964 the Commission in Exquisite Form Brassiere,
Inc., 03 rejected on factual grounds, respondent's claim of good-faith
meeting of competition in the granting of discriminatory promotional allow-
ances. The Commission rejected the defense basically through reliance
upon its "knowledge" requirement, °14 although the respondent attempted
to bring itself within the Continental Baking factual situation by showing
graphically that allowances had been granted only in response to com-
petitor's initial allowances to customers.0 5
3. Enforcement Through the Federal Trade Commission Act
To compound this inconsistency in approach, the Commission, in
Max Factor,10 announced a policy of proceeding in the future through
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in buyer-induced promo-
tional discrimination cases. The Commission refused to accept the meeting
100 TRADE REG. REP. 16720 (FTC Dec. 31, 1963).
lol Sub norn. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., TRADE REG. REP. f 16800 (FTC Feb.
10, 1964).
102 However, the Commission's insistence that the defense has consistently been
denied to sellers of goods normally priced at a premium, id. at 21755, does not establish
a precedent for requiring a respondent to establish the comparable quality of the
competitor's goods. The hearing examiner originally had accepted the meeting com-
petition defense and had therefore dismissed the charges. Callaway Mills Co., TRADE
REG. REP. 15412 (FTC Sept. 29, 1961).
103 TRADE REG. REP. f 16753 (FTC Jan. 20, 1964).
104 See notes 39-51 supra and accompanying text.
105 Ibid. Compare notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text.
10 6 Max Factor & Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16992 (FTC July 22, 1964).
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competition defense which two suppliers interposed against charges of
granting special "promotional" allowances to a buyer who had solicited
them. The court of appeals reversed,10 7 and, on remand, the hearing
examiner sustained the defense and dismissed the charges against one of
the respondents."' s The Commission, however, speaking through Com-
missioner Elman, who had written the Continental Baking opinion, avoided
ruling on the meeting competition defense. It entirely dismissed the
charges on the grounds that section 5, with its broad prohibition of "unfair
methods of competition," is better calculated to deal with the problem of
"special" promotional allowances-which, in the Commission's opinion, is
basically one of buyer-induced discrimination.10 9
The significance of this pronouncement lies in the fact that the entire
Robinson-Patman Act is fundamentally directed at buyer-induced dis-
crimination." 0 Promotional discriminations are in no way distinct from
price discriminations; both are primarily buyer-caused."' The similarity
between the two is illustrated by the ease with which the courts extended
the meeting competition defense to cover promotional, as well as price,
discrimination 112 and by the Commission's immediate acceptance of this
extension," 3 despite its continued refusal to recognize other judicial refine-
ments, such as permission of "offensive" meeting of competition." 4 In the
same situations in which section 5 would prohibit promotional discrimina-
tion, it would equally prohibit price discrimination. For example, the
protracted Tri-Valley Packing "5 case involved not only the question of
the legality of the competitor's price under the meeting competition defense
to the section 2(a) charge of price discrimination."8 The Commission in
fact brought, although it apparently did not press, charges under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act." 7 Thus, in the price discrimination
context, the same behavior which evoked Robinson-Patman Act proceed-
ings carried with it a section 5 charge almost as an automatic concomitant.
'
0 7 Sub nor. Shulton, Inc. v. FTC, 305 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1962).
The Commission subsequently accepted the defense as applicable to § 2(d) of the
Robinson-Patman Act J. A. Folger Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16078 (FTC Sept. 18,
1962).
108 BNA AxTrrRuST & TaDE REG. REP. No. 134, at A-9 (Feb. 4, 1964).
1 o9 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16992 (FTC July 22, 1964).
110 See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
"' Compare notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
31 See Shulton, Inc. v. FTC, 305 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1962); Exquisite Form
Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888
(1962).
"3 See J. A. Folger Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16078 (FTC Sept. 18, 1962).
114 See Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962); Delmar
Constr. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1961 Trade Cas. 1169947 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
15 60 F.T.C. 1134 (1962), reVd on other grounds, 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964).
16 See notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text.
17 Complaint 7225, issued August 6, 1958, charged discrimination under § 2 of
the Clayton Act. Complaint 7496, issued May 15, 1959, charged discrimination
(unlawfully favoring one retail merchandise chain over competing customers) under
§ 5 of the FTC Act.
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A similar abandonment of Robinson-Patman enforcement is evident
in the area of buyers' liabilities. Although section 2(f) of the Robinson-
Patman Act 1s in terms renders illegal only buyer's knowing receipt or
inducement of a discrimination in price, considerable authority interprets
it as applicable to buyer's inducement or receipt of promotional allowances
on the ground that such allowances constitute a variant form of indirect
price discrimination.119 However, the Commission has chosen to employ
section 5 of the FTC Act against this discriminatory practice. Although
not all courts agree that section 2(f) covers promotional discriminations,
the Connission's refusal in other areas readily to accept judicial inter-
pretation of Robinson-Patman Act provisions suggests that its decision to
forego Robinson-Patman enforcement in this area must be construed as a
voluntary preference for enforcement through section 5.
Moreover, the FTC has recently provided substantial evidence of
qualifying its enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act by a "public
interest" concept similar to that specifically found in section 5 of the
FTC Act. 2 0  Thus, in a striking departure from past practice, it has
refused to issue cease-and-desist orders in several cases, even after finding
violations of section 2(a). 121 Some historical basis for this shift in en-
forcement policy may be found in Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTCm
where the Supreme Court set aside a court of appeals decision postponing
the effectiveness of a cease-and-desist order under section 2(a) until com-
peting firms were similarly restrained. The Court held that determination
of the advisability of such a postponement was peculiarly within the com-
petence of the Commission. Alluding to Moog, the Commission, in
Atlantic Prods. Corp.,n3 postponed the effectiveness of an order against
discriminatory advertising allowances until it could prepare a trade regula-
tion ruling. In Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc.,'2 4 the same factual situation-
discriminatory promotional payments by various drug producers--evoked
118 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1958).
119 Strong judicial authority sustains recovery of treble damages in private actions
brought against buyers receiving discriminatory promotional allowances. Hartley &
Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916, 922-23 (5th Cir. 1962) (buyer's
inducement and receipt of discriminatory allowances proscribed by § 2(d) treated as
violations of §2(f)); American Co-op. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153
F.2d 907, 913 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946); Castlegate, Inc. v.
National Tea Co., 1963 Trade Cas. 70952 (D. Colo. 1963) ; Krug v. IT&T Corp.,
142 F. Supp. 230, 237-38 (D.N.J. 1956). In the landmark case of Grand Union Co.
v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962), approving the FTC's attack on promotional
allowances under § 5, the court of appeals specifically avoided deciding whether § 2(f)
applied to promotional discriminations. The Supreme Court withheld the same ques-
tion in Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 73 n.14 (1953). The
Commission itself in the early days of the act treated § 2(f) as applicable to promotional
discrimination. See RowE,, PRICE DisclRuINATIoN UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATmAN
Act 432 (1962).
120 See Withholding Cease-and-Desist Orders in Robinson-Patntan Act Cases,
BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 173, at B-1 (Nov. 3, 1964).
121 Ibid.
I= 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
23 TRADE REG. RE'. f 16676 (FTC Dec. 13, 1963).
124 TRADE REG. REP. f[ 17007 (FTC July 27, 1964).
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proceedings under both the Robinson-Patman and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Acts. The Commission proceeded under the FTC Act against the
drug companies allegedly inducing the discriminatory promotional payments
and under Robinson-Patman against the drug producers.125 However, the
Commission postponed the effectiveness of the order entered against the
producers pending "declaratory findings" to be made in the FTC Act
proceedings. 26 And in Sperry Rand Corp.,27 the Commission based its
refusal to issue a cease-and-desist order on the unlikelihood of recurrence
of the unlawful conduct involved.
Against this background the FTC's observations in Ponca gain added
significance. There the Commission, although basing its decision on ac-
ceptance of the meeting competition defense, nonetheless indicated that
there was in fact little need for a cease-and-desist order since invocation
of New Mexico's Fair Trade Law had already ended Ponca's price
reductions to large retailers.1 28  Thus, even if the meeting competition
defense had not been sustained, the Commission might have avoided issuing
a cease-and-desist order on the ground specified in Sperry Rand-a ground
conceptually allied to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Despite the difficulties the Commission has experienced in applying
its rigid standards in proceedings under the Robinson-Patman Act, the
Commission would be ill-advised to embark on enforcement through a sec-
tion 5 standard, either by importing section 5 values into the Robinson-
Patman Act or through utilizing section 5 itself as a separate vehicle for
encouraging competition. The greatest danger here does not arise from
the gross generality of the FTC Act's broad prohibition on "unfair methods
of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce." 129 Although section 5 is "probably the broadest statute in the
land," 130 it seems likely that, as applied to situations otherwise falling
under the Robinson-Patman Act, the courts will insist upon delimiting its
generalities with the substance of the Robinson-Patman Act's standards of
proofs and defenses.
The Commission itself, in I. Weingarten, Inc.,13 1 has ruled that in a
promotional discrimination case brought under section 5 of the FTC Act,
25Id. at 22098; McKesson & Robbins, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 115943 (FTC
June 19, 1964); Druggists' Serv. Council, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 15944 (FTC June
19, 1964). The docket listings in the CCH service, indicating the bringing of com-
plaints 8510 and 8511 (in the latter two cases) exclusively under Robinson-Patman,
are apparently incorrect.2 6 Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 1 17007, at 22098 (FTC July 27,
1964).12 7 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16791 (FTC Feb. 17, 1964).
'23 Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16814 (FTC Feb. 24,
1964).
12952 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1) (1958).
-1O Address by FTC Chairman Dixon, American Association of Advertising
Agencies, April 28, 1962, in 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 n.2 (1964) ; see Rahl, Does Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act Extend the Clayton Act?, 5 ANTITRUST
BULL. 533, 538 (1960) ("may be the widest delegation of law-making power ever
made by Congress").
13 1 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16349 (FTC March 25, 1963).
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the buyer-recipient has the right to present possible justifications for the
discriminations, such as lack of knowledge,132 just as in a Robinson-Patman
case he would have available the meeting competition defense. And the
Supreme Court, in affirming a section 5 order against a geographic pricing
system, held that the meeting competition defense is implicit in section 5
when used in the discrimination context.133 Although the Second Circuit
has confirmed the Commission's right to employ section 5 against pricing
practices contrary to the "spirit," although not the letter, of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 3 4 it is not at all likely that the courts would approve the
blanket use of section 5 as a replacement for proceeding under the Robinson-
Patman Act. It is more likely that the ambiguous standard of the FTC
Act will be imported into the Robinson-Patman Act, not that the Robinson-
Patman Act will be superceded by section 5 or employed to give rigid
form to the FTC Act's provision. The Commission's recent actions in
postponing section 2 cease-and-desist orders seem to confirm this likelihood.
However, the Commission may well be confusing flexibility in utilizing
the meeting competition defense with freedom not to enforce the Robinson-
Patmahi Act. Herein lies the great danger that true reform will be stifled
by apparent flexibility unrelated to a solution of competitive problems. The
Commission may thus ignore the basic problem under Robinson-Patman-
the reconciliation of price competition with the prohibition of price dis-
crimination. Trade regulation rules, post hoc evaluations of guilt, and
flexibility in postponement or abrogation of cease-and-desist orders do not
in any way arrest the spiraling of price discriminations. To the extent
that ambiguous standards will permit erosion of the right to meet competi-
tion (as under a trade regulation rule ostensibly establishing conditions of
promotional allowances, but thus actually imposing a prima facie implica-
tion of illegality on any deviation therefrom), they are inconsistent with
the aims of the present antitrust laws. Where the use of section 5 would
promise long periods of litigation and development of possibly fruitless
standards, it should not be employed; but where it would allow more direct
attack on buyer-induced discrimination, it would be welcome. All of these
areas, however, can be improved by administration of the Robinson-Patman
Act itself. If the Commission can supplement improved procedures by
applying to the meeting competition defense its newly-found "flexibility,"
reconciliation of price competition with price nondiscrimination will be
near achievement.
B. Optional Reporting: The Answer to the Spiral Effect
A conceptual approach allowing full utilization of the meeting com-
petition defense will not alone render the Robinson-Patman Act workable.
13
2 Id. at 21182-83.
133 FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 426-27, 431 (1957).
134 American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Grand Union Co.
v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962); see Giant Foods, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
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So long as the Commission enters the scene subsequent to the spiraling of
discriminatory prices, recognition of the seller's right to meet competition
does nothing to break the cycle of differentiations in favor of large buyers.
If the deterrent power of publicity or the limited inhibitory effect of Com-
mission cease-and-desist orders 135 is to prevent spiraling of discrimina-
tions, Commission action as near as possible to the time of the original
discrimination is essential. In view of the Commission's extremely limited
resources -16 for handling a regulatory problem of exceptional magnitude
and its unsatisfactory record in utilizing such resources as it has had,
13 7
effective enforcement policy is significantly dependent upon industry self-
policing. Given this situation, a flexible interpretation of "good faith" in
the meeting competition defense can be of great value in obtaining for
the Commission the necessary information.
If the Commission could depend upon individual businesses for in-
formation on discriminations purportedly made to meet competition,
approximately at the time when the discriminations were being made, the
Commission would be able immediately to initiate action to prevent the
price discrimination from spiraling. Although the Commission lacks the
power to issue cease-and-desist orders without investigations and hear-
ings,138 the very fact of the Commission's knowledge is likely to have
substantial inhibitory effect on further discriminations. In any event the
Commission's usual post hoc responsiveness will be considerably quicker,
and opportunities for accumulating evidence and ascertaining factual situa-
tions will be correspondingly increased. Moreover, the receipt or non-
receipt of such a report would be one factor among others in ascertaining
the presence of good faith. As long as businessmen are assured that the
Commission is actually undertaking to evaluate good faith in accord with
the total situation and will not rule against the purveyor of a discriminatory
price automatically upon learning of the discrimination, the businessman
who is honestly responding to a competitive situation will have little reason
not to inform the Commission of his price reduction. Thus informed, the
FTC will be in a position to carry out the essential Robinson-Patman policy
of limiting the cycle of discriminatory pricing by removing any unlawful
price-cutting catalyst as quickly as possible. The businessman in turn
will be free to pursue his own course without fear of artificial agency in-
terpretation of his action. But if he hopes to avoid the Commission's
135 See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text.
138 For example, in FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948), a case of
extraordinary importance, the Commission was able to pit three attorneys and a
single economist against a defense staff encompassing forty-one law firms and an
expenditure by respondents in excess of five million dollars. Blair, Planning for
Competition, 64 COLUm. L. Rxv. 524, 525 (1964). The total funds available to the
Commission for the fiscal year 1963 amounted to $11,471,973. 1962-1963 FTC ANN.
REP. 31.
13 7 See notes 28-30 stpra and accompanying text.
138 See FTC Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958).
Broadly written orders to some extent allow avoidance of this restriction through
permitting control of future conduct. See Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 706 (1962).
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knowledge while illegally discriminating in price, his actions would be
clearly stamped with an inference of bad faith. Moreover, business ethics
would not impede the effectiveness of the reporting system, because a com-
petitor would be in no way reporting on anyone other than himself. By
definition a businessman would not intend to report the illegal action of a
competitor when revealing his own response; moreover, he is not usually
able to determine the legality or illegality of the competitive price he is
meeting.
A flexible interpretation of good faith demands that failure to file such
a report at the time of making the discrimination should not ipso facto
constitute either a violation of Commission rules or a rebuttal of good faith
meeting of competition. The Commission might well draw a different
inference from the failure to report by a large corporation, with alert legal
counsel and long experience in dealing with the FTC, than from the failure
of a small firm to supply equivalent information. Adoption of such a
flexible reporting requirement is clearly within the Commission's present
power.'
32
A flexible reporting requirement coupled with a flexible evaluation of
good faith will facilitate competition while inhibiting price discrimination,
effectively implementing both general antitrust policy and the price dis-
crimination rules of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Edward E. Cohen
132 The Commission's powers include the right to order regular and special
reports, FTC Act. §6, 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §46(b) (1958), to demand
access to the records of any corporation, and to issue subpoenae requiring the pro-
duction of documents at investigatory hearings, FTC Act § 9, 38 Stat. 722 (1914),
15 U.S.C. §49 (1958). See Pollock, Pre-Complaint Investigations by the Federal
Trade Commission, 9 ANTITRUST BUiL. 1 (1964). These powers have been charac-
terized as probably the broadest and deepest possessed by any Government agency.
Babcock, Legal Investigation, in ABA, AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 385, 386 (1958).
Legislative history makes it clear that the power to order special reports is available
in furtherance of any Commission activity.
The reports which are required are of course thought to be necessary to
carry out the purposes of the act-that is to say, to give the commission
information which may be needed to make the act effective-but the com-
mission may, under subdivision b, require any corporation at any time to
furnish it any information that it sees fit to ask for, the extent of its request
being limited only by its own discretion.
51 CONG. REc. 1182 (1914) (remarks of Senator Thomas). United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950), for example, permitted the Commission to require
special reports as to the manner in which a corporation was complying with a decree
enforcing a cease-and-desist order entered under § 5 of the FTC Act.
